责任代理模式（PPT 26页）

我请您们考虑一些问题
Asmallmedicalinsurancescenario一个医疗保健的问题
Whenyouhaveasmallillnessdoyounormallyseeyourdoctor?
当你有小病的时候你会不会自费看医生？
Whataboutifyourfirmpayforyourexpense?
但是如果是单位付钱呢那又怎样？
我请您们考虑一些问题
Acarmaintenancescenario一个汽车维修的问题
Yourcarisbeingrentedfor2months.Supposedlyitneedsoilingeverymonth.Howlikelyyouwillremembertodoso?
你的汽车是租来用两个月的它需要每月润滑上油一次你会不会依时地去上油？
Howaboutifthisisyourowncar?
如果这是你自己的汽车你又会不会去做？
我请您们考虑一些问题
Amedicalinsuranceproblem自费医疗保险的问题
Whenwepurchasemedicalinsurancetheinsurancecompanyusuallyrequiresthatyoudiscloseyourmedicalhistory.Pre-conditionsareusuallyexcludedfromthecoverage.
购买保险的时候它们通常要求你列出你的病歷但是如果你有大病的话很可能保险公司不愿意受保
我请您们考虑一些问题
Ifyoudoinfacthavesomemajormedicalproblemsthatrequireexpensivetreatmentswouldyoudisclosetheseproblems?
如果你真的有大病你会不会真实地上报？
Whatdoallthesetellusaboutcertainhumanbehavior?
这些问题表明了一些什么的人性行为？
AgencyProblemsandBehavior代理人的行为与问题
Amoralhazardproblem(道德危机问题)
whenanindividualhasanincentivetodeviatefromthecontractandtakeself-interestedactionsbecausetheotherpartyhasinsufficientinformationtoknowifthecontractwashonored.
医疗保健虽然我知道我与雇主的契约明确列出我不要浪费公司的资源但是用公司的好过用我的嘛！而且公司又不会知道我未能遵守契约
AgencyProblemsandBehavior代理人的行为与问题
Ahorizonproblem水平界线问题
Ifoneparty’sriskorcompensationisnotthesameastheotherparty’stheonewithashorterhorizonwilltendtosecretlymaximizetheshort-termbenefitsattheexpenseoftheotherlonger-termparty.
汽车维修我明白汽车不维修寿命不会长但是两个月以后这车子变成怎么样与我无关了吧
AgencyProblemsandBehavior代理人的行为与问题
Anadverseselectionproblem逆向选择问题
Thetendencyofindividualswithprivateinformationaboutsomethingthataffectsapotentialtradingpartner’sbenefitstomakeoffersthataredetrimentaltothetradingpartner.
自费医疗保险:虽然我知道保险公司需要知道我的病歷从而决定保险费但是诚实的代价是较高的费用此外我不说谁知道
谁是代理人？什么是代理成本？
Anagentissomeonewhohascertainspecialexpertisethatisdesiredbytheprincipaltouseforhis/herbenefits.Theagentisusuallyriskadversehasdecisionrightstomanagebutdoesnotowntheorganization’sassets.
代理人(agent)是任何人在公司有决策权力但是并非产权的最终所有者代理人通常有较佳的专长更好的资讯和对风险抱保守的态度(riskadverse)
谁是代理人？什么是代理成本？
Therearethree(3)typesofagencycosts.代理成本有三类：
设计限制性契约的成本(bondingcosts)
建立监督制度的成本(monitoringcosts)
剩余的损耗(residualloss)
Notethatsomecostsareborntbytheprincipalbutsomeareborntbytheagent.
注意的是有时这些成本是由委托人(principal)负担不过有时这些成本是由代理人自己负担的
AgencyCosts
Bondingcosts–costsincurredbeforeenteringthecontracttoconvincetheprincipalthatsuchagencyrelationshipwillnotresultintheabove-mentionedagencyproblems.Examplesare:reputationbuilding3rdpartyguarantoretc.
AgencyCosts
Monitoringcosts–costsincurredafterenteringthecontracttoensurethatsuchagencyproblemswillnotarise.Examplesincludeauditingandinspectioncosts.
AgencyCosts
Residualloss–lossunavoidablyarisedespitethebondingandmonitoringcoststhecontractstillcannotyieldtheutmostbenefitsbecause:
theagencyproblemsdoariseor
duetothesuspicionoftheagencyproblemstheprincipalrefusestopaytheagentcompensationsthatfullyreflecthis/herefforts.
ExamplesofthePrincipal-agentModel
ExamplesofthePrincipal-agentModel
Whatcanwesayuptothispoint?
Underconditionofunobservability(incompleteinformation)fixedpaymentstoagents(i.e.workersemployees)mostlikelydonotwork.
Whatarethenthealternatives?
Wecangivetheprincipalafixedpaymentinstead.
Orwecancomeupwithan“incentivecompatible”conditionalcontract.
FixedPaymenttothePrincipal
FixedPaymenttothePrincipal
Thusnumericallythiswillworktoensurethattheagentgivesthehighesteffort.
Howeverthereisnonethelessalosstotheprincipal(33504-32750)=754whichisinasenseamonitoringcost(maximumcosttopayforaninformationsystemtorevealtheagent’seffortlevel).
Butthemostfundamentalproblemisthatthistypeofcontractsviolatesthe“riskadverse”natureoftheagent.Nowtheagentbecomestheprincipal!
IncentiveCompatibleContract–ProblemSetup
IncentiveCompatibleContract–SpecificSolutions
SummaryofDifferentContracts
Whatdoweknowfromthese?
Thebestcasescenariofortheprincipaliswhenhecanobservetheagent’seffortleveldirectly.
Theworstcasescenariototheprincipalappearstobesimplychargingafixedrent.
Thedifferencebetweenthetwo($754)representsthemaximumamounttopayforaninformationsystemtorevealtheagent’seffort.
Themiddle2ndbestsolution(incentivecompatiblecontract)maynotalwaysbethenextbestthingthough!
AFewCautionaryRemarks
Thismodelpresentedhereisasingle-periodmodel.Multiple-period(repeatedgames)cangiveverydifferentanswers.
Therecanbemultipleprincipalsaswellasmultipleagentsinthemodel.Suchmodelshoweverbecomeextremelycomplex.
Informationsystemsarenotconsideredhere.
ConcludingRemarks
ThePrincipal-agentmodelistheoreticalelegantbutmathematicallytedioustouse.
Empirical(real-life)evidenceseemstosupportthemodelwell.
Thechallengesinmyopinioninclude:
tocomeupwithusefultestablehypotheses;
toextendthemodeltomorecomplexbutrealbusinesssituations;
toencourageresearcherstoteachnewcomersthebasicskillinunderstandingthemodelratherthansimplytopublishin“ivory-tower”typeofjournals.
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